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The task of identifying appropriate models of journalism for Pacific 
Island nations as they strive for more democratic governance is not a 
straightforward one. This article summarises several contending models 
of democracy—market liberalism/competitive elitism, public sphere 
liberalism, and radical democracy—and their attendant expectations of 
news media. When measured against the stated ideals of press freedom, 
and notwithstanding the emergence of the internet, the existing news sys-
tems of the dominant Western liberal-democracies, notably the US and 
UK, have significant democratic shortcomings, in relation to ‘watchdog’, 
public sphere, community-building and communicative equality criteria. 
Accordingly, the author argues that the practices and concept of press free-
dom need to be expanded and supplemented by a broader understanding 
and implementation of communication rights, entailing legal and cultural 
forms that support the full participation of all segments of society. Such a 
paradigm is especially appropriate for postcolonial countries dealing with 
issues of economic development and inter-ethnic conflict.
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SURROUNDED by distinguished practitioners, teachers and research-ers of media and democracy in the South Pacific, I am acutely aware that my personal and academic background is rooted in the North At-
lantic heartland of global capitalism—the US, UK and Canada. But I want 
to advocate critical selectivity rather than wholesale adoption of ‘Western’ 
models of democracy and media in the global South, and to express hope that 
South Pacific nations may be able to bypass some of the entrenched short-
comings of dominant Western media.
Gandhi was once (perhaps apocryphally) asked, ‘What do you think of 
Western civilisation?’ He famously replied, ‘I think it would be a good idea’.
One could say the same about Western democracy and its associated 
concepts of press freedom. There is a large gap between ideals and practice. 
Postcolonial societies, such as many in the South Pacific region, need thought-
fully to select what aspects of the currently hegemonic Western societies they 
adopt. For example, US officials see their country and media as global exem-
plars of democracy and freedom, but many Americans themselves critique their 
political system as a plutocratic, corporate, imperial and/or national security 
State, with the dominant media serving as a propaganda system for ruling 
elite interests (e.g. Herman & Chomsky, 1988). In my own country, some 
critics worry that Canada is descending towards an authoritarian petro-State. 
The democratic deficits of their own regimes do not stop Western officials 
like Hillary Clinton from lecturing countries of the global South on how to 
implement democracy. That is not what I intend to do here.  Rather, I would 
like to offer food for thought.  Is the standard liberal concept of press freedom 
the most useful normative guideline for journalism in an emerging democratic 
polity—or are more recent concepts, such as ‘communication rights’, a better 
guideline? Are they necessarily exclusive? What kind of journalism would 
help foster governance that is stable and peaceful, as well as democratic and 
sustainable (in the dual sense of being able to reproduce itself, as well as be-
ing ecologically responsible)?
Let us acknowledge immediately that ‘democracy’ is not a goal universally 
shared. In the context of economic stagnation and political turbulence, a major-
ity of Russians apparently feel that strong leadership is more important than 
democracy. In Bhutan, the king had to persuade a people reluctant to abandon 
monarchy, to vote in parliamentary elections. Concerns for security, stability 
and economic well-being often trump commitment to democracy, and in the 
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context of globalisation, the concept itself carries the baggage of association 
with hegemonic Western capitalism. Yet democracy, in the sense of legitimacy 
derived from a popular mandate, is undeniably the globally-dominant form 
of political legitimation: ‘Political regimes of all kinds describe themselves 
as democracies’ (Held, 2006, p. 1).  
Equally undeniable is that ‘democracy’ carries radically different meanings 
for different ideological perspectives.  Political theorist David Held (2006 ) des- 
cribes ‘autonomy’ as a principle common to most conceptions of democracy:
…[P]ersons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obliga-
tions in the specification of the political framework which generates 
and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they should be 
free and equal in the processes of deliberation about the conditions of 
their own lives and in the determination of these conditions, so long 
as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others. 
(Held, 2006, p. 264)
Even within this commitment to equality and self-determination, there can 
be quite different emphases, and reasons for favouring democracy in the first 
place. Democracy can be regarded instrumentally, and sometimes grudging-
ly, as the best way of achieving other objectives—as a means of protecting 
citizens against each other, guarding against bullies, and limiting the abuse 
of power by governments; or as a means of maintaining political stability in 
pluralist societies, partly by making government decisions bindingly legiti-
mate; or as the best form of government to protect human rights and indi-
vidual dignity. Or democracy can be regarded more fulsomely, as a form of 
government and society through which people have the maximum oppor-
tunity to develop their full human capacities. As the late Canadian political 
theorist C. B. Macpherson (1966) argued, the ‘real world of democracy’ can 
encompass, in theory at least, vastly different political and economic sys-
tems—from free market neoliberalism, to the Marxist project of building a 
classless society.
Thus, depending which rationale is considered key—protection or de-
velopment—there are different models of democracy, each with different 
expectations of how journalism should function, what its ethical principles and 
practices should be, and what institutional and legal framework best supports 
it. In the next sections, I briefly outline three models that have underpinned 
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(explicitly or implicitly) recent academic and policy debates on the demo-
cratic roles of journalism: market liberalism; public sphere liberalism (akin 
to deliberative democracy); and radical egalitarian democracy (including but 
not confined to socialism).1 
Market liberalism and elitist democracy
Since the 1980s, the ‘free market’ vision of democracy has gained political 
and cultural hegemony in the US and UK. This ideology holds ‘that govern 
ment is best which governs least’—with the exception that the State’s mili-
tary, police and prisons are seen as necessary to preserve the social order.  
Democracy is seen not as an end in itself, but as normally the best institu-
tional arrangement to maintain political stability and a liberal political culture 
characterised by individual rights and choice, particularly economic rights of 
ownership, contract and exchange.
Though it often adopts a populist and anti-elitist stance, this ‘free mar-
ket’ vision actually fits well with an elitist version of democracy, classically 
articulated by Joseph Schumpeter (1942/1976; cited in Baker, 2002, p. 130). 
His theory of ‘competitive elitism’ meshes with market liberalism’s emphasis 
on private consumption rather than public virtue. Given the complexity of 
modern political issues, the vulnerability of the masses to irrational and emo-
tional appeals, and the risk of overloading the political system with competing 
demands, ongoing public participation (in this view) is neither necessary nor 
even desirable. While they should be fairly autonomous from the mass public, 
policy-makers can be held sufficiently accountable through periodic elections, 
the entrenchment of individual political rights (assembly, expression), and a 
free press. Democracy is seen as a procedure for selecting leaders, with citizen 
participation confined mainly to voting every few years—essentially, the role 
of consumers in a political marketplace.  
Journalism would thus have several roles.  
• By exposing corruption and the abuse of power, the press should act 
as a watchdog on government, which is considered the main threat 
to individual freedom.  
• The press ‘need not provide for nor promote people’s intelligent po-
litical involvement or reflection,’ since ‘meaningful understanding 
of social forces and structural problems is beyond the populace’s 
capacity’ (Baker, 2002, p. 133); nor need it raise fundamental ques-
tions about State policy or the social order.
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• But journalism, particularly the ‘quality’ press, can report intra-elite 
debates and circulate ‘objective’ information useful to elites them-
selves—a mandate for journalism articulated last century by the 
legendary American political columnist Walter Lippmann (1963).
If free market liberals (known in the US as ‘conservatives’) see a democratic 
deficit in contemporary journalism, they usually focus on one of two per-
ceived problems. One is the influence of the State, whether through infor-
mal attempts by governing politicians to manipulate journalists; or through 
formal laws and regulations, such as restrictions on media concentration; or 
through outright State ownership of media enterprises, such as public service 
broadcasters. Such State intervention (it is argued) distorts the marketplace, 
undermines media’s ability to give consumers what they want, and risks 
State authoritarianism.
Conservatives, especially in America, see a second problem with news 
media—a pervasive hostility towards mainstream or middle American 
authority figures or values, due mainly to the ‘left-liberal’ political biases of 
journalists—a myth that helped legitimise Fox News as a right-wing electronic 
soapbox.
These market liberal critiques rest on very debatable assumptions, as do the 
practical ‘solutions’ that flow from them (such as privatisating and deregulating 
media, or hiring more conservative journalists). The ‘left-liberal bias’ thesis 
focuses on journalists as individuals, and downplays their institutionalised 
routines and pressures (especially from business and the State) that in the view 
of most media sociologists largely determine the shape of news (Shoemaker 
& Reese, 1996). Conservative critics offer relatively little evidence that jour-
nalists’ presumed liberalism is radically at odds with the political culture, or 
that it systematically influences actual news content.  
The notion that free market policies generate democratic journalism 
has been extensively critiqued elsewhere (e.g. Baker, 2002; Curran, 2002; 
McChesney & Nichols, 2010), and in a later section of this paper. Briefly, 
market liberals ignore the extent and implications of concentrated and con-
glomerate media ownership, high costs of entry in traditional media markets, 
and advertising as a basis for underwriting the production costs of journalism. 
At best, market liberals’ prescriptions for media ‘work’ only if one accepts 
their very truncated and elitist notion of democracy.
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‘Public sphere’ liberalism
The elitist model of democracy has been criticised on many grounds. Its 
negative view of citizens’ participation is unduly pessimistic; in referenda 
and elections on fundamental issues, citizens have shown a remarkable 
capacity for learning and civic engagement. Conversely, scandals such as the 
apparent manipulation of security intelligence by the Bush and Blair govern-
ments before the 2003 Iraq war, suggest that the elitist model overestimates 
the competence and accountability of policy-makers, absent ongoing public 
participation.  
Similarly, the related market liberal approach to democracy overlooks 
the excessive power of concentrated wealth in policy-making processes. 
It dismisses the threat to political equality and even meaningful individual 
freedom posed by the growing gap between rich and poor. And it ignores the 
erosion, by a culture of acquisitive individualism, of the sense of community 
underpinning democratic governance.
Such considerations have strengthened an alternative vision that accepts 
the elitist democrats’ support for individual rights and an independent ‘watch-
dog’ press, but places a much higher value on popular participation through 
established political channels. Participation can be valued as a means to both 
produce more just and legitimate policies, and to develop the democratic 
capacities of citizens.  
Liberal participatory democrats prioritise the role of media in facilita- 
ting or even constituting a public sphere— ‘that realm of social life where the 
exchange of information and views on questions of common concern can take 
place so that public opinion can be formed’ (Dahlgren, 1995, p. 7).
As theorised since the 1989 English-language publication of Juergen 
Habermas’s now-famous dissertation, the public sphere is not necessarily a 
physical setting, but a conceptual space within various venues. It is ‘a neutral 
space within society, free of both State or corporate control, in which the media 
should make available information affecting the public good, and facilitate 
a free, open and reasoned public dialogue that guides the public direction of 
society’ (Curran, 2000, p. 135). It is characterised ideally by discussion free 
of domination, equality of participation, and rationality in the sense of an 
appeal to general principles rather than sheer self-interest. In a participatory 
democracy, government policy would reflect the decisions of a civil society 
collectively deliberating about its future.  
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In such a deliberative and participatory democracy, what specific roles 
or tasks are expected of public sphere-building journalism?2 Baker (2002) 
advocates two offsetting types of news media: first, a segmented system which 
provides each significant cultural and political group with a forum to articulate 
and develop its interests; and second, journalism organisations which can 
facilitate the search for society-wide political consensus by being universally 
accessible, inclusive (civil, objective, balanced and comprehensive), and 
thoughtfully discursive, not simply factual (pp. 129-53).  
Norris (2000) proposes a checklist of ‘public sphere’ tasks for journalism: 
• If news media are to provide a civic forum that helps sustain plu-
ralistic political competition, do they provide extensive coverage of 
politics, including a platform for a wide plurality of political actors? 
• Do media provide ‘horizontal’ communication between political 
actors, as well as ‘vertical’ communication between government and 
governed?  
• Are there multiple sources of regular political news from different 
outlets, underpinning effective government communication, multi-
ple venues for public debate and reduced costs to citizens for be-
coming politically informed?  
• Is there equal or proportionate coverage of different parties?  
• Finally, as an agent in mobilising public participation, does journal-
ism stimulate general interest, public learning and civic engagement 
vis-à-vis the political process? (pp. 25-35).
Radical democracy and the political economy critique
The public sphere liberals’ critique is a limited one. It seeks to reform the 
practices of journalism, but does not raise fundamental questions about the 
market-oriented corporate structures of news media, and still less the social 
and political order. By contrast, radical democrats offer a more robust set of 
benchmarks for evaluating media performance. If market liberals emphasise 
individual liberties and restrictions on government power, and public sphere 
liberals highlight public deliberation about policy, radical democrats add a 
third dimension—a thoroughgoing view of democracy as not just a set of 
procedural rules, but a societal environment which nourishes developmental 
power—everyone’s equal right to ‘the full development and use’ of their 
capabilities (Macpherson 1977, p. 114; Downing et al. 2001, pp. 43-44).  
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Such a standpoint transcends public sphere liberalism in several respects. 
First, radical democrats seek not just to reinvigorate the existing system of 
representative democracy, or to ensure equality of legal and political rights 
for everybody. They also prize approximate equality in wealth and power, and 
direct participation by people in making the decisions that affect their lives.
Second, radical democrats have a more critical and holistic view of power 
in capitalist society. In their view, political and economic elites may have 
interests which conflict with those of the rest of the population. A democratic 
public sphere cannot be insulated from power hierarchies embedded in State, 
economy, gender and race; so long as they exist, they will tend to undermine 
equality of voice in the public sphere. Thus, given these and other assumptions, 
radical democrats are often quite critical of unregulated corporate capitalism 
and its impact on politics, society and the environment.
Given this view of power and democracy, what political roles are expected 
of news media? Radical democrats endorse the watchdog and public sphere 
functions celebrated in the previous two models respectively, but add such 
criteria as these:
• Enabling horizontal communication between subordinate groups, 
such as workers, women, ethnic minorities—and social movements 
as agents of democratic renewal (see Hackett & Carroll, 2006, chap-
ter 3). By giving public voice to civil society, media can facilitate 
needed social change, power diffusion and popular mobilisation 
against social injustices.
• Expanding the scope of public awareness and political choice by 
reporting events and voices which are socially important but out-
side, or even opposed to, the agendas of elites. Such issues include 
environmental sustainability and other extra-market values integral 
to a just and humane society.
• Counter-acting power inequalities found in other spheres of the 
social order. As McChesney (1999, p. 288) has put it, ‘Unless com-
munication and information are biased toward equality, they tend to 
enhance social inequality’. The unchecked inertia of market-driven, 
corporate-dominated journalism will tend to transpose economic 
inequalities to the cultural and ideological spheres.
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Implications of contending views of democracy: Structured pluralism
Before proceeding further, I want to draw attention to several implications of 
these different normative models of democracy and media.
First, one must distinguish between two concepts that are often confusingly 
conflated in Western news and political discourse. Democracy (a word deri- 
ving from the classic Greek for rule by the people) denotes popular sovereignty 
and decisions by majority vote; so democratisation of the media might then 
imply popular participation in shaping media policies and content, reflecting 
reasonably proportionately the political and cultural diversity of the society. 
Liberalism (deriving from the Latin word for freedom) denotes the rule of 
law and respect for individual rights; so liberalisation of media and commu-
nication could imply a legal framework that protects media operations and 
individual rights of expression from arbitrary or authoritarian State action. In 
the context of post-authoritarian ‘transition societies’ in eastern Europe and 
elsewhere, media liberalisation has also come to mean the widespread intro-
duction of commercialisation and private ownership. While democratisation 
and liberalisation are compatible in many ways (and while they have histori-
cally fused in the typical Western regime-form known as liberal-democracy), 
they are conceptually distinct. I am arguing that some forms of liberalisation 
(particularly the dominance of market forces) are not necessarily compatible 
with democratisation of the media field.
The diversity of concepts of democracy, and of democracy’s relationship 
to economic liberalism, leads to a second implication. No single type of media 
can serve all democratic purposes. There is no perfect one-size-fits-all demo-
cratic news organisation. Arguably, contemporary democracy is best served by 
‘structured pluralism’ in the media system, in which each of several types of 
co-existing media make distinct contributions and offset the biases or limita-
tions of the other types (Curran, 2000). Privately-owned commercial media 
are good at providing entertainment, responding to popular tastes as expressed 
through the market, and potentially acting as a watchdog on political power; 
but not so good at investing in quality journalism or culturally-distinct drama, 
or holding the powerful business sector accountable. Those latter tasks are 
better fulfilled by public service broadcasting (PSB) organisations such as the 
BBC; but critics fear that PSB is too vulnerable to pressure from the govern-
ments that fund it. Smaller-scale alternative and community media also have 
a role: in giving voice to local concerns, oppositional or counter-hegemonic 
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perspectives, and minority cultures; in limiting the dominance of corporate 
or State media; and in providing greater opportunities for ordinary people to 
participate directly in media production. Indeed, in Canada, all three sectors 
(private, public service, community) are statutorily recognised as integral to 
the broadcasting system, though they are not treated or funded equally.
Structured pluralism in media implies that not all journalistic media 
need to be ‘objective’, at least in the limited sense that it has acquired in the 
US (as Baker, cited above, notes). There, objectivity has been reduced to a 
set of somewhat rigid and ‘conservatising’ practices, such as relying very 
heavily on official sources, and covering conflict as ‘balance’ between two 
sides. To be sure, a democracy can ill afford a news system filled with deli- 
berate falsehoods and manipulative communication intended to deceive and 
persuade—i.e. propaganda in the worst sense. But it is possible to imagine a 
democratic media system with a diversity of news outlets expressing different 
and counter-balancing political orientations, as in Western Europe.  
Such structured pluralism will not occur spontaneously through market 
mechanisms, however, precisely because not all these forms of media (and 
their associated journalisms) are profitable; market-driven media are only one 
of several sectors. Thus, though it may seem paradoxical to market liberals, 
there is a potential positive role for governments, in creating the conditions 
for a diverse and free press—not through censorship, dictation or punishment, 
but through arm’s length subsidies, incentives, regulation and democratically-
constructed legislative mandates. Governments are not likely to be enthusiastic 
about facilitating independent media that might criticise them; the current state 
of government-media relations in many South Pacific countries confirms this 
generalisation. Thus, civil society and social movements need very energeti-
cally to advocate democratic media policies, and to build independent media 
themselves.
Given the conceptual diversity of ‘democracy’ and of the role of media, it 
is no surprise that in structure and practice, there is no single model of media-
State relations. Even within generally similar Western liberal-democracies, 
a pioneering comparative study of 18 countries identified three models: 
polarised pluralism, democratic corporatism, and (market) liberalism (Hallin 
and Mancini, 2004). But what is common to all the concepts and models of 
democratic media discussed thus far, is a commitment to ‘press freedom’ in 
the sense of media autonomy from the State, and guarantees of individual 
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freedom of expression. In the next section, I consider whether North Atlantic 
media actualise the democratic expectations for press freedom.
Press freedom in the US and the UK?
To revisit the challenge implied by Gandhi’s comment on Western civilisa-
tion, does the US (as the world’s most powerful liberal-democracy) fully en-
joy the benefits of a ‘free press’, one that holds power accountable, extends 
citizens’ freedom of expression and right to be informed, and provides a 
diverse ‘marketplace’ of ideas? Clearly, the US press is ‘free’ in the sense of 
being mostly privately owned and largely free of overt censorship, backed by 
a constitutional guarantee. The US press undoubtedly does sometimes contri- 
bute to public enlightenment and political reforms. Two prominent examples 
are the Pulitzer Prize-winning computer-assisted research on racial bias in 
banks’ mortgage-lending practices in the 1990s, and famously, the exposure 
of the Watergate scandal by Washington Post reporters, leading to President 
Nixon’s resignation in 1974. In my own country, Canada’s national election 
of 1988, fought over the issue of ‘free trade’ with the US, was hailed as a high 
point for media support of public political engagement. On a more everyday 
level, some researchers find a ‘virtuous circle’ between exposure to news 
media, and trust/participation in the political system (Norris, 2000).  
But that optimistic view is challenged by a ‘media malaise’ thesis advanced 
by ‘critical’ researchers who see significant democratic deficits in contem-
porary US journalism. And journalists themselves (e.g., Fallows, 1996) are 
starting to agree. After all, they have much to worry about—drastic cutbacks 
in newsroom resources, the increasing exploitation of short-term ‘precarious’ 
labour, and in the UK, stunning scandals involving Rupert Murdoch’s British 
media properties. Shaking the very legitimacy of the press as an institution, 
those scandals involved not only phone-hacking and the invasion of privacy, 
but also high-level corruption and the corrosion of democracy.
Several major themes leap out from the critical evaluations of the per-
formance of American news media, which arguably fall short in relation to 
all three of the models of democracy outlined above (see Hackett & Carroll 
2006, chapter 1).
The sleeping watchdog/concentration of power
First, constitutional guarantees of press freedom do not necessarily translate 
into effective monitoring of power by dominant media organisations. There 
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are several reasons. With the retreat of the ‘welfare State’ and the rise of neo-
liberalism, business has wielded enormous and arguably growing influence 
over public policy as well as the economy since the 1980s. Business control 
over the commanding heights of the economy gives it a de facto veto over 
economic policy (Miliband, 1973), but corporate power is also exercised 
more directly, for example, through subsidising policy institutes, conduct-
ing lobbying and financing election campaigns. The essayist Thomas Frank 
(2013) reports that the recent US election cost about $6 billion; one implica-
tion is that viable presidential candidates are in effect dependent upon bil-
lionaire sponsors.  
Yet dominant news media have paid little attention to the implications 
of corporate power for democracy, society, economy and environment, and 
still less attention to alternatives to it. Thus, disasters like the Enron scandal, 
the sub-prime mortgage bubble burst, and the bank collapse of 2008 catch 
conventional journalism completely by surprise, as did the 2011 Occupy Wall 
Street protests against corporate greed and economic inequality. Part of the 
problem is the traditional liberal assumption that publicly-relevant power 
resides with government, not the private sector. But more important are the 
interlocking interests between the media, political and corporate spheres. 
Dominant commercial media not only depend on advertising revenue from 
big business; they are now big business themselves, bound by overlapping 
ownership, joint ventures and shared political ideology to the rest of the cor-
porate sector (Bagdikian, 1997). And they may have shared interests with the 
political elite; two leading analysts of American media politics suggested that 
the US media’s now widely-recognised failure to critically cover the Bush 
administration’s rationale for invading Iraq in 2003—an intervention which 
cost thousands of lives and perhaps a trillion dollars—was partly related to 
media corporations’ hopes for regulatory favours from that same administra-
tion (Nichols & McChesney, 2005).
The watchdog may be too well fed and comfortable to bother barking. 
Media corporations are themselves sources of concentrated symbolic and 
political power. As early as 1997, the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and 
educator Ben Bagdikian (1997) estimated that the number of media corpora-
tions ‘with dominant power in society’ had shrunk to 10 and it is fewer than 
that now, comprising in his view a ‘private ministry of information’ (pp. xiii, 
1). Needless to say, media corporations are not critically monitoring them-
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selves. If legal guarantees of press freedom are defined by policy-makers and 
by courts as property rights of media owners, rather than the right of a people 
to express and inform themselves, then they can be used to fend off govern-
mental efforts to restrict concentration of ownership, to support the rights of 
journalists vis-à-vis employers, or to facilitate access to the public sphere of 
people who do not own the means of symbolic production.  
Less obvious than direct corporate influence, more subtle forces reduce 
access and diversity in the public sphere. To the extent that information is 
commodified, its production dependent on sales to affluent consumers and/
or subsidisation by advertisers, the door is open to market-based structural 
censorship. Historically, the history of the British press suggests that market 
forces worked better than government repression at confining radical opposi-
tion to the margins of public discourse (Curran, 2011, pp. 140-152). Each year, 
Project Censored in the US finds newsworthy stories that, while not censored 
by government officials, simply do not get published in dominant media. The 
list for 2012 includes America’s slide towards a police State, the ecological 
devastation of the world’s oceans and the unreported radioactivity from the 
Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster—all news that calls into question estab-
lished ways of doing business (see www.projectcensored.org).  In Canada, our 
similar NewsWatch project found ongoing blind spots in the national press on 
issues of workers’ rights and working conditions, environmental degradation as 
an ongoing problem, poverty and social inequality, corporate political power 
through lobbying and public relations, white-collar and corporate crime and 
the dark side of Canada’s involvement in militarism (Hackett et al., 2000). 
Standard agenda-setting theory suggests that media silence will generally be 
matched by lack of public awareness or demand for action on these issues. 
Since such action would challenge the interests of dominant elites, that silence 
suits them just fine.  
Failure to help constitute a democratic public sphere
For much of the 20th century, the American press had been able to balance its 
character as a market-based advertising-dependent industry, with notions of 
professionalism and social responsibility. That balance was achieved partly 
through incorporating commercial imperatives into such professional notions 
as ‘objectivity’ (Hackett & Zhao 1998), but nevertheless enabled the press 
to constitute some semblance of a public sphere, providing civic information 
and a discussion forum for, at least, mainstream political perspectives.
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That balance has been shifting since the 1980s, partly due to changes 
within the media system—the shift from local and family ownership of 
newspapers, to ownership by conglomerates driven by shareholders intent on 
short-term profit; deregulation of broadcasting; and the rise of digital media. 
Combined with broader political and cultural change, such as multicultural-
ism and the blurring of boundaries between public and private spheres, the 
era of ‘high modernism’ in American journalism has ended (Hallin, 2000). 
While some observers have seen the decline of the ‘professional model’ as an 
open door for new kinds of media democratisation, I want to highlight two 
undoubtedly negative consequences.  
One consequence is the sharp cutbacks of investment in resources for 
journalism. Original newsgathering, local coverage and investigative journal-
ism have been decimated. Important news may be ignored if it is regarded 
as too costly to produce; North Atlantic news organisations have cut back 
substantially on foreign news coverage since the end of the Cold War. Con-
versely, ‘reality’ programmes, infotainment and celebrity news abound. The 
economic crisis of American and British journalism is not one of profitability, 
but of under-investment (Freedman, 2010).
A second impact is the marketability of ‘sensationalism’, a form of jour-
nalism that lends itself far too readily to an anti-democratic politics of moral 
outrage. I recall a conversation with a (white) man fishing in a canal on an 
idyllic day in the English countryside a few years ago. Watching the swans 
floating by, he commented how much he enjoyed nature and wildlife, and 
then turned direction, suggesting it was all being ruined by ‘immigrants’. He 
cited the story of Muslim refugees from Kosovo, capturing and barbecuing 
royal swans. Shock, horror! It turned out the story was a fabrication, but one 
widely publicised by Rupert Murdoch’s tabloid Sun, the largest circulation 
paper in the UK. Right-wing British tabloids (and more recently, Fox News in 
the US) have been notorious for attracting audiences by appealing to prejudice, 
oversimplifying stories, ignoring contexts, reducing conflicts to two-sided 
contests of good versus evil and demonising not only foreign enemies, but 
internal opponents of neoliberalism, such as militant trade unions (see, e.g. 
Williams, 2009). That kind of journalism is likely to exacerbate racial tensions, 
xenophobia and authoritarian approaches to social problems. 
Undermining community
A third cluster of themes emerging from the ‘media malaise’ thesis points 
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to a failure of journalism to help build a sense of community. I am speaking 
not of reinforcing ethnic or geographically-based identities, to the exclusion 
of ‘outsiders’. Rather, I refer to journalism’s capacity (and expected role) of 
helping to create a sense of intertwined fates and of common futures, at le- 
vels that range from the local to the global; to find expressions of commona- 
lity as well as of difference (Howley, 2005, p. 6); and to build our collective 
capacity to identify and solve problems.  
When read from that perspective, critical media scholarship suggests 
several ways in which US journalism is not helping to sustain community. 
One problem is the shrinking of local news, a growing disconnection from 
local communities. Since the Telecommunications Act 1996, ownership 
concentration and corporate rationalisation in the radio sector has led to the 
near-disappearance of local radio news. One notorious incident illustrates the 
real hazards of absent local news: a train crash unleashed clouds of toxic gas 
in Minot, North Dakota, in 2002. Local emergency authorities, wanting to 
warn the populace to stay indoors, discovered to their shock that nobody was 
staffing the local radio stations, all owned by one corporation—they were all 
programmed by computer from corporate headquarters in Texas! One man 
died, and hundreds of people sustained injuries (Klinenberg, 2007, pp. 1-11). 
At the national level, the rise of vehement partisanship in broadcasting, 
spearheaded by the right-wing Fox News network, has reinforced polarisation 
in the political system; so too has the spread of blogs and websites that make 
it easier for politically-interested citizens to cocoon within their own ‘opinion 
tribes’. The decline of general interest journalism means that compared to a 
generation ago, Americans find it easier to avoid, ignore and dismiss opinions 
and information that challenge their own convictions.  
Commercial films and television, particularly prime-time entertainment, 
pose a different threat to an inclusive sense of community at the national level. 
The research of the late communications scholar George Gerbner demonstrated 
that violence-saturated TV drama ‘cultivates’ particular views of the world 
among heavy viewers; they are less trustful of other people, more likely to 
see the world as threatening and violent and more favourable to authoritarian 
solutions (such as more prisons) to social problems (Gerbner, 2002). More- 
over, commercial media whose lifeblood is advertising are likely to promote 
audience-grabbing entertainment over politically-empowering, citizen-relevant 
information, and an ethos of consumerism and narcissistic individualism, 
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values that are not particularly compatible with building sustainable communi-
ties. And at the international level, it is similarly not obvious that media are 
helping to build a global civil society. However subtly, nationalist biases still 
manifest themselves, as most audiences rely on their own country’s media for 
news, and even transnational media (such as satellite TV news networks) are 
based and funded in individual states. One could, for example, read America’s 
free press daily for a year, and still have little idea why US foreign policy 
arouses such hostility in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Communicative inequality
In both State and commercially-based media systems, those who own the 
means of communication obviously enjoy a privileged position in public dis-
course. Others face institutional barriers to entry, some of which are specific 
to media systems (such as lack of professional skills, or high start-up costs), 
others of which broadly reflect the uneven distribution of economic and cul-
tural capital (including literacy, social connections and prestige). The Ameri-
can political columnist A. J. Liebling famously said, ‘Freedom of the press 
is guaranteed only to the man [sic] who owns one’. In a commercial system, 
there are barriers more subtle than legal exclusion or outright censorship. It 
is biased towards affluent consumers over the less affluent, and right-wing, 
pro-business views over left-wing perspectives more critical of capitalism. 
Market-driven media follow not the democratic logic of ‘one person, one 
vote’, but rather, ‘one dollar, one vote’. In the huge ‘emerging market’ of 
India, for example, quality, content and choice in the corporate/commercial 
media are overwhelmingly skewed towards promoting a consumerist life-
style for the urban and English-speaking ‘consumer-audiences’, virtually ig-
noring the informational and communicative needs of the 41.6 percent of the 
total population that falls below the international poverty line (Saeed, 2012).
Will the internet set journalism free?
Will the internet enable journalism to avoid the democratic deficits of the 
hegemonic North Atlantic media? Debates about the internet’s impact 
on public communication, particularly journalism, are well rehearsed. 
Technophiles emphasise its perceived contributions to democracy, includ-
ing its potential for interactivity and many-to-many communication, and its 
capacity to evade or bypass censorship, to counterbalance propagandists in 
a more diverse marketplace of ideas, to facilitate transnational mobilisation 
by democratisation movements, and vastly to reduce the costs of publishing, 
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thus broadening the range of voices and information in the public domain, 
with the Wikileaks revelations being a recent example.  
The internet can amplify the voices of peacemakers, witnesses and victims 
in conflict situations, subject disinformation by elite sources to more effec-
tive public refutation (Allan, 2010, pp. 195-217) and enable communities 
collectively to discuss matters ranging from school picnics to global warm-
ing. The internet can also incubate new forms of journalism. As one of these 
new forms, online citizen journalism has transformed public discourse in 
important ways—broadening the range of opinion and eyewitness accounts 
in the public domain; forcing established news media to react more quickly 
to breaking events or to correct errors, forcing journalists to spend more time 
being accountable to ‘the people formerly known as the audience’, in Jay 
Rosen’s phrase (Allan, 2010, p.242); and sometimes setting the media agenda.
But do digital networks, including social media, automatically promote the 
kind of dialogic and inclusive communication that can revitalise democratic 
journalism? There is nothing magical about the internet. The ‘digital divide’ in 
access to and effective use of the internet, parallels and reinforces rather than 
challenges the distribution of cultural, political and economic power globally. 
It can be used as conduits for hate, racism and harassment campaigns. Perhaps 
because of the cloak of anonymity, online discussions of important political 
issues seem to degenerate too easily into vituperative personal attacks, a phe-
nomenon I have sadly witnessed in both Canada and Fiji. Even responsible, 
volunteer-based citizens’ journalism, while it usefully fills gaps in the news 
system, cannot replace the daily reporting of professional journalists. As two 
leading American media reformers put it:
…there needs to be a significant body of full-time paid journalists, 
covering their communities, the nation, the world, in competition and 
collaboration with other paid journalists.  There need to be independent 
newsrooms where journalists who are secure enough in their livelihoods 
to focus on their work can…receive professional editing, fact-checking 
and assistance.  There needs to be expertise, developed over years of trial 
and error, in vital areas of specialty and paid journalists accountable for 
those beats….There needs to be news institutions that can preserve and 
promote journalism…support long-term investigative work, and free 
up journalists to do their work, rather than having…to hustle their next 
meal through shaking down an Internet micropayment or a commercial 
advertisement for their blog. (McChesney & Nichols, 2010, pp. 81-82)
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Expanding press freedom through communication rights
My review of North Atlantic news media has been one-sidedly critical, in 
order to highlight aspects that would be problematic if they were thought-
lessly replicated in Pacific Island countries—the sensationalising of conflicts 
through ‘Us versus Them’ narratives, the privileging of marketable infotain-
ment over educational and development-oriented information, the excessive 
concentration of symbolic power and the reinforcing of socio-economic and 
communicative divides between rich and poor, urban and rural.  
Without exception, the Western critics I have quoted universally accept the 
idea of press freedom, but feel that (as Gandhi implied) Western realities fail to 
live up to the stated ideal. Some analysts call for reforms in media structures 
and practices in order to achieve a genuinely independent, informative and 
diverse press. Others go further, to suggest that the concept itself needs to be 
(re)defined as a right of people in general, not just a property right of media 
owners (e.g. Barron, 1981, pp. 11-19). Others go still further, arguing that not 
only does the concept need to be expanded in theory and better implemented 
in practice, but supplemented by other rights and concepts, if democratic 
communication is to be fully actualised. Such critics point to limitations 
inherent in the liberal concept of a free press, and of individual freedom of 
expression that historically underlies it. In the liberal tradition, it applies to 
individual rather than collective or group rights (such as the right of cultural 
or linguistic minorities to maintain the conditions of their communal exis- 
tence). Protection of individuals’ expression from censorship or punishment 
by the State or its agencies, does not extend to other centres of power; thus, 
a worker fired by a private sector employer for expressing dissident views 
enjoys no constitutionally-enshrined remedy. Constitutional guarantees of 
free expression generally do not extend to the conditions needed to make such 
expression meaningful in an era of mass media, viz., access to the means of 
communication. The underlying vision of society is one of a ‘kind of debating 
club’ of individuals with ‘an equal right to conceive, impart and receive ideas 
from others and thereby to rationally arrive at decisions of mutual benefit’ 
(CRIS Campaign, 2005, p. 21).  
Such a vision ignores the real-world blockages to the free and effective 
use of free expression in the many societies that are profoundly unequal. 
Such blockages include illiteracy; suppression or marginalisation of minor-
ity languages; social class inequalities that translate into unequal access to 
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educational material, or to basic communication services, such as telephone 
or internet; government and corporate secrecy and surveillance; the enclosure 
of knowledge through ‘intellectual property’ regimes; hierarchies of ‘cultural 
capital’, in which some forms of expression (such as written press releases) 
are privileged over others (such as the oral tradition); concentration of media 
ownership; and the domination of public communication by commercial or 
State propaganda. Legal protection of press freedom does not offset or address 
these threats to building a communicative democracy and a more just society; 
indeed, as noted above, when it is defined as a property right of media owners, 
the ‘free press’ can be used as a judicial weapon to prevent the more equal 
distribution of communicative resources through public policy.
Does this critique mean that ‘press freedom’ should be abandoned as a 
legal, political or ethical principle? Absolutely not. A press that is free from 
control by a self-serving State apparatus is fundamental. It is a chief means of 
holding governments and power-holders accountable, exposing and preventing 
corruption (one of the chief barriers to genuine social development), enabling 
a society to identify and address problems and to discuss and find its own path 
to development, engaging and developing people’s capacity for democratic 
citizenship and helping people to feel that they have a voice in determining 
their country’s future, and thereby an obligation to participate in building it. 
Rather than discarding it, press freedom needs to be supplemented by a 
more expansive notion of ‘communication rights’. That concept derives not 
only from radical democratic critiques of market liberalism in the West, but 
more significantly, from the New World Information and Communication 
Order (NWICO) debate that erupted in the United Nations and other inter- 
governmental arenas in the 1970s and 1980s. Originating with the Non-Aligned 
Movement of Third World countries seeking neutrality in the Cold War bet- 
ween the Soviet and Western blocs, and with deep roots in anti-colonialism 
and Third World demands for fairer global economic and communication 
orders, NWICO’s landmark was the UNESCO-commissioned MacBride 
report. That report endorsed ‘the right to communicate’ without defining it 
very clearly (MacBride, 1980, pp. 172-174), and the UN buried the concept 
along with the report itself, given the ferocious and successful opposition 
of the US and UK governments and Western-based media conglomerates to 
NWICO (for retrospective analyses, see Galtung & Vincent, 1992, pp. 31-121; 
Nordenstreng, 1999). But in the more workable guise of plural communication 
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rights, the concept has since been adopted by civil society media reformers 
in diverse countries.  
A communication rights (CR) approach to journalism and media policy 
would aim to do much more than protect individuals’ right to speak, or 
media’s right to publish, without State punishment (though of course these are 
included). CR are intended to overcome barriers to listening—such as preju-
dice, hate and discrimination (CRIS Campaign, 2005, p. 24)—and to foster a 
social, cultural, legal and political environment favouring the production and 
sharing of social knowledge; a sense of community; and human rights outside 
the communicative domain.  
One of the international leaders of the CR movement is the ecumenical 
international development organisation, the World Association for Christian 
Communication (WACC). It summarises the concept as:
…those rights that enable all people everywhere to express themselves 
individually and collectively by all means of communication in order to 
improve their lives. Communication rights are vital to full participation 
in society and are, therefore, universal human rights belonging to every 
man, woman, and child. Communication rights encompass freedom 
of expression, freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
knowledge. But they add to these freedoms, both for individuals and 
communities, the concepts of accessibility, participation, and cultural 
diversity.  Communication rights include democratisation of the media, 
protection of traditional means of communication, linguistic rights, and 
the right to enjoy the fruits of human creativity. These are questions of 
inclusion and exclusion, mutual respect and human dignity. (WACC, 
n.d.  Emphasis added) 
Communication rights thus include freedom of expression and of press, but 
are much more expansive. CR envisage journalism actively contributing to 
a social cycle of communication (CRIS Campaign, 2005, p. 26). Freedom of 
expression entails the right to seek and receive ideas, to generate ideas and 
opinions; and to express and speak without fear of government punishment. 
CR add to this the right to be heard (and the reciprocal obligation to listen); 
the right to be understood; to learn, enhance and create ideas and informa-
tion; and to respond to others and share with them, as integral to participation 
in the life of one’s community and society. Press freedom is deepened and 
expanded, to include or facilitate such desiderata as access to relevant public, 
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government and corporate information; genuine diversity as well as plurality 
of media organisations and content; balanced ‘intellectual property’ regimes 
that do not unduly restrict users’ rights; and universal access to public media 
(CRIS Campaign, 2005, p. 43).  
Philosophically, a society which fully embodied communication rights 
for all would have much in common with the public sphere and radical egali-
tarian models of democracy outlined above. It could be considered a ‘com-
municative democracy’, in which every cultural, ethnic and political sector 
can circulate ideas and information that potentially reach every other sector 
of society (Jakubowicz, 1993).  
This expansive concept of CR reminds us that it is not just political philoso-
phy and laws on the books that shape how journalism works in practice. Media 
systems influence, and are influenced by, the political, social and economic 
systems and the cultural traditions of each society. Thus, it is difficult to specify 
precisely what journalism structures and practices would best institutionalise 
CR in different societies. Suitable communication policies might include the 
kind of ‘structured pluralism’ discussed above; public service and community 
media that are relatively free from corporate and State control, with mandates 
to both reflect diversity and find common ground; rights of access and/or reply 
to dominant media; limits to concentration of media ownership; guarantees of 
free expression subject to limitations (such as hate speech, defamation, and 
incitement to violence) that are recognised in most democracies; widespread 
media education and literacy programmes; and affordable access to telecom-
munications services and digital networks.
But State policy clearly cannot do it all. There is a role, on the one 
hand, for journalism education and professional paradigms, such as Peace 
Journalism, as a more contextualised, responsible, accurate and comprehen-
sive way of reporting conflict, one that is arguably especially appropriate for 
societies characterised by inter-communal conflict, and that will undoubtedly 
be discussed elsewhere in this journal. On the other hand, at the macro-level, 
communicative democracy both reinforces and requires a political culture of 
civility and respect, and an economy that avoids inequalities and antagonisms 
between social classes serious enough to render stable democracy nearly 
impossible.
From the North Atlantic to the South Pacific
How relevant are the concepts of press freedom, democracy and commu-
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nication rights to Pacific Island countries? After all, with the exception of 
NWICO, most of the ideas I have been discussing were developed in the 
context of ethnically-homogeneous nation-states with privileged positions 
(often including colonial or informal empires) in the global political eco- 
nomy. I am no expert on this region; other contributors to this volume will 
bring to bear more detailed knowledge. I conclude this essay by briefly con-
sidering the ethical implications for journalism of two distinctive challenges 
facing many South Pacific nations—material poverty and peripheral posi-
tion in the global economy; and ethnic conflict, in the context of a history of 
authoritarian and/or colonial government.
Development journalism
Some academics and journalists argue that the specific material, political and 
social needs of ‘developing countries’ of the global South necessitate a dis-
tinct form of journalism based on ‘development communication’ (Wilkins, 
2008). Such Development Journalism (DJ) would comprise the strategic use 
of reporting intentionally to promote social change. This model privileges 
the role of education over entertainment, public goals over commercial prin-
ciples and long-term structural processes over coverage of today’s events 
(Waisbord, 2012, p. 149).  
All well and good.  But does that mean that countries such as Fiji should 
discard Western notions of the free press and adopt a distinctive ‘Southern’ DJ 
paradigm? I argue not, for several reasons. First, DJ is not a single, coherent 
paradigm. It is a ‘complex and contradictory notion’ that combines two dif-
ferent approaches: a social and communitarian reporting of rural, education, 
health and economic news that affects ordinary people, amplifying popu-
lar voices in identifying problems and solutions; and by contrast, a Statist 
approach that envisions journalism as an instrument of government policies 
to build integrated, stable and economically-advanced societies (Waisbord, 
2012, pp. 148-150). The former, communitarian approach is compatible with 
press freedom, and even more so with communication rights, which more 
explicitly call for widespread participation in the social cycle of communica-
tion. The latter, Statist approach consciously contravenes press freedom, in 
the name of other nation-building goals, including internal ethnic harmony; 
but arguably, history suggests that it can backfire. It removes a vital means 
of holding governments accountable, facilitating corruption and arbitrary 
dictatorship that ultimately may undermine just and sustainable economic 
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progress. Robert Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe is an egregious example. 
A second reason for rejecting a separate ‘Southern’ model of journalism 
is that any such model would be: 
…embedded in an essentialist vision about the ‘global South’. Just 
to cluster countries as ‘poor’ (or ‘wealthy’ for that matter) says little 
about supposed common demands for a certain model of journalism.  
One could argue that a journalism that contributes to participation, 
citizens’ expression and social justice...is not linked to the position of 
countries in the ‘Human Development’ index. Rather, it is a require-
ment for democracy without adjectives and geographical boundaries. 
(Waisbord, 2012, p. 154)
It would be wrong simply to impose models from the imperial citadels of 
global journalism, and thereby to ignore ‘particular histories, cultural trajec-
tories and unique realities’ (Waisbord, 2012, p. 156). But it is also problem-
atic to insist that ‘journalism should uncritically support government poli-
cies in the name of national security and integration’ or to insist that there 
are ‘unique local values’ that journalism should embody, to the exclusion of 
independence and diversity. 
 
The danger is to fall into essentialist and relativist positions that ro-
mantically view local models and ethical prescriptions as inherently 
good.  Such positions easily provide justification for curtailing debate 
and critical reflexivity on the grounds that they threaten values such 
as ‘respect for authority’ and ‘local morals’. (Waisbord, 2012, p.155)
The idea of communication rights implies a critique of, and the need for al-
ternatives to, both corporate-dominated, market-driven journalism, and State 
authoritarian control over media— whether in the global North or South.
Ethnic conflict
In ethnically-mixed societies with a history of ethnic conflict, one of the 
justifications for the Statist version of Development Journalism has been the 
perceived need to enforce press support for government policies of national 
integration, and conversely, to censor coverage that could inflame ethnic 
relations. Such a position might be especially appealing to some in coun-
tries like Fiji, where the media have been blamed in the past for stimulating 
violent ethnic conflict.  
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But the ‘solution’ of censorship, as one facet of authoritarian government, 
is worse than the cure. There is no doubt that in recent history, media have 
helped pave the way for ethnic cleansing and genocide, most disastrously in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (Thompson, 1994). But in those cases, 
the problems were rooted in social cleavages and political machinations, not 
the media as such. In so far as media did play a role, the conflict was exac-
erbated by the suppression, not the presence, of a press that was sufficiently 
independent from dominant political forces (including the governments of 
Rwanda and of the former Yugoslav republics) to expose the latter’s destruc-
tive strategies and propaganda. Having spoken with journalists and researchers 
in three former Yugoslav republics, I am persuaded that such censorship and 
intimidation, far from preventing ethnic cleansing, was actually integral to 
politicising ethnic identities, spreading fear and unchecked misinformation, 
demonising other ethnic groups and inciting people to slaughter their former 
neighbours. Imagine that communication rights had been effectively institu-
tionalised in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The minorities under attack would 
have had guaranteed access to respond, and more broadly, the society would 
have nurtured a culture of respectful dialogue.  
I do not mean to trivialise the challenges of a multi-ethnic society strug-
gling with economic scarcity and inequality. Driven by commercial or political 
considerations, a ‘free press’ may indeed pander to its audience’s prejudices 
and exacerbate conflict through sensationalised coverage. But as a means of 
containing ethnic tensions, press censorship—even if well-intentioned—could 
allow tensions and misperceptions to fester underground through such mecha-
nisms as gossip, graffiti and unregulated ‘social media’. If not addressed, 
such tensions could explode when authoritarian government collapses from 
popular discontent and from its own inefficiency and corruption. The recent era 
of globalisation provides numerous examples, particularly when the rapid 
introduction of political (competitive elitist) democracy enables direct chal-
lenges to the previous power of ‘market-dominant’ ethnic minorities (Chua, 
2003).
As previously noted, censorship may be justifiable in extreme cases, such 
as incitement of hatred or violence. But positive alternatives to censorship are 
arguably more ethically justifiable and effective in the long run. These could 
include journalism training and institutional support for Peace Journalism, or 
as some prefer to call it, conflict-sensitive reporting. (For an introduction, see 
Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; for recent developments, see Shaw, Lynch and 
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Hackett, 2011). Another longer-standing tradition is public service journalism, 
which is independent of both State and capitalist control, and has a mandate to 
promote minority cultures, as well as social cohesion and inter-cultural com-
munication. Elsewhere, such journalism is most often housed within public 
service broadcasting (PSB) organisations. A comparative study of European 
multi-ethnic states indicates a diversity of segmented and universal PSB models 
with varying degrees of effectiveness in supporting democratic stability (Basic-
Hrvatin et al., 2008). Without their own tradition of PSB, Pacific Island nations 
may prefer other routes to develop public service journalism. We should also 
be mindful that journalism cannot solve all the world’s problems; inter-ethnic 
relations are profoundly intertwined with the economic, education and political 
systems in particular. Moreover, an ‘enabling environment’ for responsible 
and effective media takes time to develop, involving change in the profes-
sional practices and ethos of journalism and in the broader culture, not just 
legal and structural reforms (Price & Rozumilowicz, 2002). The point is that 
the expansion of communication rights, not their restriction, is fundamental 
to long-term social stability, as well as democracy.
A similar case could be made for other challenges, such as global warm-
ing.  Pacific Island countries are not responsible for this unfolding ecological 
catastrophe, but they disproportionately bear the brunt of its impact, such as 
rising sea levels and extreme weather. Effective mitigation and adaptation 
require the circulation of accurate information, open discussion of policy op-
tions, and the active participation of those most affected by climate change, 
in the social cycle of communication at both regional and global levels.
History suggests that expanded popular communication rights will not 
be granted through the benevolence of governments. They are built from the 
ground up—through alternative and community media, through the com-
municative needs of popular movements addressing vital needs for just and 
sustainable development and through campaigns aiming specifically at media 
democratisation. If they succeed in such struggles, the peoples of the South 
Pacific may have a good deal to teach those of us in northern America.
Notes
1. The following three sections are derived from Hackett, R. (2005), Is there a 
democratic deficit in US and UK journalism?  In Allan, S. (Ed.), Journalism: Critical 
issues (pp. 85-97). Maidenhead, UK: Open University.
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2. While deliberative and participatory democracy are not equivalent, as Held (2006) 
points out, I am conflating them for purposes of this comparative discussion.
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